Agent-readable docs index: /llms.txt. Full docs in one file: /llms-full.txt. Download /docs.zip to grep all markdown files locally.

Trust, identity, and private app access

Fleet is built for personal code you trust on computers you own. Each layer — private networking, HTTPS certificates, Gate sign-in, and OS permissions — solves a distinct problem.

Private networking

Tailscale handles encrypted device-to-device transport. Fleet never exposes public links, guest access, or Tailscale Funnel, and it never rewrites your tailnet ACL policy.
Your gateway only resolves and routes gate.fleet and apps you explicitly register. Unknown .fleet hostnames are rejected during both DNS lookup and TLS SNI negotiation.

Per-installation certificate authority

During fleet setup, your gateway creates a unique root certificate authority stored in ~/.fleet/v2/pki. Its private signing key never leaves the gateway.
Each registered app gets a short-lived leaf certificate for its exact hostname (never a wildcard). The iPhone .mobileconfig profile contains only the public root certificate — never the signing key and never any device management payload.
Because trusting a root CA is a system-wide decision, only trust a root from a gateway you own, protect ~/.fleet/v2, and remove the profile if you retire the gateway.

Fleet Gate sessions

Certificate trust proves you're talking to your own gateway; Fleet Gate authenticates the browser session.
  • Sign-in uses short-lived device codes (fleet gate) or owner-only local tickets (fleet open).
  • Sessions use __Host-fleet cookies (Secure, HttpOnly, SameSite=Lax, host-scoped per app) so an app never sees your Gate cookie or another app's cookie.
  • State-changing POST requests check the Origin header to block cross-site request forgery.
  • fleet gate reset revokes every browser session immediately:
fleet gate reset

Trusted personal code

App servers run in Bun workers under your normal operating-system user account. Fleet is not a sandbox for untrusted third-party code: a server handler can access files and network resources that your user account can access.
Review agent-written code before handing an app sensitive credentials or private files. On Linux and macOS, only a tiny root-owned port forwarder binds ports 443 and 53; the Fleet daemon and all app workers run strictly as your unprivileged user.

Secrets and invitations

  • Store API keys in .env.fleet.server and read them from ctx.env on the server. Fleet excludes this file from Git and never bundles it into the browser client.
  • Computer invitations (fleet invite) are single-use and expire after 10 minutes. Transfer them privately and delete copies once enrolled.
  • Keep device codes, setup URLs, invitation files, and SQLite backups out of public issues and logs.

Data safety

A failed build keeps your previous working bundle online, which protects availability — not data history. A valid edit that compiles can still overwrite or delete records in ctx.db. Use fleet backup before risky edits or schema changes, and keep backups off the app host. See data and jobs.